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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, a magazine advertisement produced by a NewYork advertising
agency prompted entertainer Vanna White to file a lawsuit contending that
the advertiser, Samsung Electronics America, had violated her right of
publicity. A relative newcomer among property rights, the common law
right of publicity first emerged into its own in the 1950s. It blossomed over

Candidate, Juris Doctor, Chapman University School of Law, Class of 2003; Senior Vice
President, California Avocado Commission. The author thanks the senior advertising executives
interviewed for their insights into the creative development process and CraigAnthony (Tony) Arnold,
Professor of Law & Director, Center for Land Resources at Chapman University School of Law for the
guidance and inspiration he provided to bring this project to fruition.
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the next two decades, shaped by case law and statutory enactments that gave
it definition and depth.
The doctrine's metamorphosis was still underway when White brought
her case before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Celebrities
seeking relief from the Ninth Circuit for right of publicity infringements
found ajudiciary willing to give expansive interpretation to the common law
right of publicity to protect those in the entertainment industry from
exploitation. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,' gave the court an
opportunity to continue the trend and ply the uncharted waters at the
confluence of the right of publicity and the First Amendment.
Drawing sharp criticism from legal scholars and commentators, the
decision was dubbed a "landmark" one that trenched First Amendment
rights of free speech and expression, undermined the predictability of prior
publicity law, and posed significant dangers for advertisers.2 In the most
vociferous criticism of all,Judge Alex Kozinski, author of a blistering dissent
in the Ninth Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc in White, declared
"something very dangerous is going on here."3 More than a decade after
White, however, documentation validating or negating the predicted
outcomes of the ruling largely remained absent from the legal literature.
This research was undertaken to illuminate whether the zealous protection
of celebrities' rights by the White court has caused advertising agencies to
avoid the use of celebrities and parody in commercial advertisements,
thereby stifling creativity and the creative process.
Results of the research show that White is significant not for its
independent impact, but instead because it brought the advertising industry
to a threshold, beyond which permissible uses of celebrity persona were no
longer fully cognizable. As the crowning point in a series of increasingly
nebulous decisions surrounding celebrity rights, White symbolized the
morass that right of publicity law had become. Ordinarily, agencies might
be expected to learn to navigate these unsettled waters. In the post-White
years, however, the advertising industry itself was changing. External
environmental influences and industry restructuring were making agencies
more risk averse and, in the face of legal uncertainties, more likely to avoid
right of publicity conflicts.
While the research disclosed that the creative process within advertising
agencies remains robust, it is clear that the cumulative effect of publicity
rights cases from the past decade has had some impact on creative concepts
1

White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter, White].

2

Steven W. Colfrd, Vanna White casegoes to trial, Samsung vows to appeal California 'likeness'ruling,

Advertising Age, Mar. 29, 1993.
3
White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993).
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ultimately flowing to the commercial marketplace of ideas. Whether these
impacts amount to a deprivation ofcultural enrichment is a highly subjective
inquiry, and the research draws no conclusion on this point. Data collected
during the study show that advertisers' reliance on celebrity endorsements
in print advertising declined throughout the 19 9 0s, and right of publicity law
undoubtedly contributed to this phenomenon, either directly or indirectly
in combination with other influences. This appears to hold true for the use
of parody in print advertising as well. Interestingly, the data show a slight
resurgence in parody in recent years, with the appearance of political figures
and deceased personalities-uses less subject to challenge-in print
advertising. The study concludes that right of publicity law has in fact had
real world impacts on the advertising business and that further research is
needed to gain a better understanding of the factors influencing agency
behavior and the relative weight of right of publicity law vis-A-vis other
business considerations.
This study primarily relies on qualitative methods to answer two main
research questions: 1) the extent to which advertising agencies changed the
way they do business following White and 2) whether there has been a
decline in the use of parody as a means of creative expression in print
advertising as a result of White. Several theoretical propositions are
advanced, against which the data collected were analyzed. These are: 1)
advertisers have been impacted by White and the line of publicity rights cases
of which White is a part; 2) the creative process has been compromised or
restricted by these decisions; and 3) the use of celebrity parody in print
advertisements produced by advertising agencies in the U.S. has changed as
a result of White and other right of publicity cases. The study utilizes a
limited, quantitative component to illuminate the third proposition.
Study results are organized into five main sections. Background
information on the right of publicity and prominent cases leading up to the
White decision are laid down in Sections II and III, to place the study in
context. Highlights of the White decision, including the dissenting opinion
ofJudge Alarcon and the Court's subsequent denial of Samsung's petition
for rehearing en banc, appear in Section IV, along with selected cases that
followed White. Next are descriptions of the issues presented and the
research design and methodology (Sections V and VI). Results of the
research, consisting primarily of excerpts from qualitative interviews and
quantitative data drawn from archival research, are summarized in Section
VII. The study concludes with an analysis of research results against the
theoretical construct in Section VIII and closing remarks in Section IX.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY DOCTRINE

The origin of the right of publicity can be traced to notions of privacy,
expressed most fully for the first time by Samuel D.Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis in 1890.4 Among Warren and Brandeis' contentions was the
concept that private individuals were entitled to protection against the
unjustifiable infliction ofmental distress resulting from the growing excesses
of the press.' A New York court was the first to grapple with the idea that
appropriation of a person's identity could be an invasion of privacy, and the
result was highly controversial. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co.,6 the
court refused to restrain the press, holding that there was no right to
protection against the use of a woman's picture to advertise flour without
her consent. This prompted the New York legislature to enact a statute
making it a misdemeanor and tort to use a person's name, portrait or picture
for advertising purposes without express written consent.7 Later courts
rejected Roberson and in due course the first form of invasion of
privacy-appropriation of name or likeness by a defendant for his own
advantage-became firmly established as precedent.
By the early 1940s, when the proliferation of radio and print advertising
gave rise to actions involving the commercial use of photographs of wellknown personalities without their consent, courts faced a different problem.
Protection of privacy no longer seemed the proper rationale for deciding
cases involving celebrities. By definition, fame is achieved through public
exposure, and the widespread use of a well-known person's photograph in
an advertisement would seem to further such interests. It soon became
apparent that the real issue was exploitation of a person's identity by another
for commercial gain and that the compromised right was that of a celebrity's
exclusive control over the use of name or likeness as means of maintaining
the value of the celebrity's persona.
The earliest decision expressly recognizing a right of publicity was a
1953 case involving the unauthorized use of a photograph of a baseball
player on baseball cards that accompanied packages of bubblegum. 8 At the
time, baseball cards were considered premiums used to promote chewing

s

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Id. at 196.

6

Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).

4

Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away From Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images From
Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LoY. L.A. ENT. LJ. 37, at 47 (1997).
8
Russell J. Frackman and Tammy C. Bloomfield, The Right of Publicity: Going to the Dogs?,
7

available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/rftb.html.
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gum sales-essentially a form of advertising. 9 In Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v.
Topps Cheving Gum, Inc.,' ° the defendant chewing-gum manufacturer
produced a baseball card and was challenged by a plaintiff who had been
granted an exclusive license by the baseball player for the use of the player's
picture to promote the sale of the plaintiffs products. The court held that
the "right to grant exclusive privilege of using one's name or likeness for
commercial purposes" was a person's "right in the publicity value of the
photograph."" While the Haelan court stopped short of labeling the right as
property, it clearly focused on the inherent economic value of a celebrity's
identity.
With the advent of television in the 1950s, advertising changed
dramatically, as did the number ofcelebrities. Over time, advertisers gained
the ability to reach millions of households in virtually every part of the U.S.,
and product market share could be correlated with the number of viewers
watching sponsored programs. The explosion in television penetration of
nationwide households elevated the number of persons thrust into public
view and abbreviated the time period necessary to achieve celebrity status.
Coinciding with these developments, the Haelan decision easily served as a
springboard for an increasing number of right of publicity cases.
The progeny of Haelan mark the evolution of the right of publicity
doctrine as it completed its transformation from its privacy-oriented roots
and the guarding against misappropriation of a person's name or likeness to
a broader concept more closely aligned with property law. During the last
four decades, the right of publicity has come to be generally defined as a
prohibition on the use of a person's name, likeness, or identity for
commercial purposes without that person's consent. 2 Expansion of the
doctrine by the courts has extended protection to other aspects or indicia of
a celebrity's identity, as explored more fully infra in this study's discussion
of the White case. Other decisions provide for the right of publicity to be
transferable and descendible. 13 Less fluid has beenjudicial interpretation of
the distinction between commercial and non-commercial uses, although
some cases that have tested the edges of this bright line rule have found it
blurred. The courts generally uphold the use of a person's identity for

9
Mark Sableman, Trademark laws underlie sportsfortunes, ST. LOuIsJOURNALISM REV. Oct. 1,
1998 at 14.
t0
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
11

Id. at 868.

12

Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition S 46 (1995).
O.Yale LewisJr., New Washington PublicityRightsLegisation,Washington State Bar Association

13

News, June 1998.
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purposes of news, commentary, entertainment or information to safeguard
First Amendment rights of free speech and expression. 4
In addition to development of the common law doctrine through case
law, many states have passed comprehensive right of publicity statutes. 1"
Statutory protections for publicity rights vary by place and degree. For
example, Washington and Indiana are considered to afford celebrities the
highest degree of state law protection. 16 In addition to name and likeness,
these states protect voice, signature, distinctive gestures and mannerisms,
and biographical facts or statistical information about a person. 7
Washington goes further still by explicitly protecting the property right that
"every natural person" has in the use of his or her name, voice, image or
other specified indicia of his or her unique persona, even if without
commercial value."8 In California, the right of publicity is governed by
section 3344 of the California Civil Code, which provides that "any person
who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner.., for purposes of advertising or selling.., without
such person's prior consent ...shall be liable for damages sustained by the
person or persons injured as a result thereof."9
In general, development of the doctrine by the courts has been justified
by several rationales, two of which are rooted in property law. The labordesert rationale reasons that the development of a commercially valuable
persona is usually accomplished through the expenditure of large amounts
of time, energy, and money. The resulting "identity," then, is the celebrity's
exclusive property; only he or she is entitled to the rewards that flow from
it. 20 Under this theory, someone who misappropriates the celebrity's
identity for commercial gain-an advertiser, for example, who exploits the
persona without paying for it-is unjustly enriched. The misappropriation
has the effect of placing the advertiser at unfair advantage over those who
pay for the use of a celebrity's identity because the cost of licensing is absent
production costs whereas the contrary is true for his
from the advertiser's
21
competitors.

14

Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publidty: Maturation of an Independent Right Protectingthe

853, 868 (1995).
Associative Value of Personality,46 HASTINGS L.J.
Lewis, supra note 13, at 3.
1s
16

Id.

17

Id.

IS

Id. at 2.

19
-0

Cal. Civ. Code S 3344 (West 2001).
Fred M. Weiler, The Righ of PublicityGone Wrong: A CaseforPrivilegedAppropriationof Identity,

13 CARDOZO ARTs&ENT. L.J. 223, 240 (1994).
Id. at 242.
21
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Another rationale for protectingthe right ofpublicity involves economic
incentive. This theory holds that rewarding a celebrity for development of
a public persona encourages creativity and achievement while promoting
cultural enrichment.22 Without means of pursuing pecuniary gain, a
celebrity would have little reason to reach for stardom. Likewise, without
the right of publicity, the economic engine referred to as the "reselling of
Hollywood" would sputter and die.' In short, the mining of celebrity status
is big business, as illustrated by the $47 million in revenues in endorsement,
licensing, royalty, and exhibition fees generated by basketball player Michael

Jordan in 1997.24
Ill. THE TREND IN CALIFORNIA BEFORE WHITE
California is recognized as being at the forefront of the evolving right of
publicity. One year before Haelanwas decided, a California court held that
unauthorized advertising might deprive a celebrity of the exclusive control
over the use of his name, voice, and likeness for commercial purposes
necessary to maintain the value of the celebrity's persona. 25 By 1971, the
California Legislature passed its right of publicity statute, and subsequent
judicial decisions established that misappropriation of a person's name or
likeness was an infringement of the right of publicity under both common
law and statute.26 Soon after, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit began a gradual broadening of the common law doctrine to provide
protections extending beyond name and likeness.27 The size and notoriety
of California's celebrity population and the economic importance of the
entertainment industry are frequently cited as reasons for the Ninth
Circuit's expansion of the right of publicity doctrine.28
Two decisions prior to White illustrate the trend in the Ninth Circuit.
In Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,29 a popular race car driver
claimed that a cigarette manufacturer's use of a photograph of his car in a
television advertisement for cigarettes violated his right of publicity.
22

Id. at 243.

23

Over My Dead Body, Hollywood Reporter, Feb. 9, 1999.
Sableman, supra note 9.
Rogers v. Republic Prod., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 328,343 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), Cal. Civ. Code

24
25
26

§

3344 (West 2001).
_7
David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailingjell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the
Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67, 71 (1995).
I
David G. Savage, Supreme CourtJoins in 'Barroom' Brawl Copyright:Justices to decide venue for
'Cheers' case. At stake is ownership of popular characters., Los Angeles Times, Sept. 25, 2000 at Al.
-9
Motschenbacher v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Although the photograph of the car was retouched and the driver behind the
wheel was not identifiable, the Ninth Circuit held that the distinctively
marked car in the advertisement uniquely identified the plaintiff, and that
California law afforded legal protection to an individual's proprietary interest
in his own identity.3" Motschenbacherpaved the way for Midler v. Ford Motor
Co. ,31 a decision that resounded throughout the advertising business. The
Ninth Circuit upheld entertainer Bette Midler's right to sue Ford after the
car manufacturer used an impersonator to mimic her voice in a radio
commercial, which featured a song popularized by Midler. Ford's use ofthe
sound-alike singer to imitate Midler's distinctive voice was an unlawful
appropriation of part of Midler's identity, the court found.3 2 As with
Motschenbacher,the decision turned on the distinctive quality of that aspect
of the identity appropriated and its strong associative link to the plaintiff.
IV. WHITE V. SAMSUNG AND SELECTED SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS

In 1992, Deutsch/Dworin, New York, developed a series of
advertisements for Samsung Electronics America. 3 The print campaign
intended to convey the message that the useful life of Samsung products
would extend well into the future. One of the ads featured a robot in a
blond wig, jewelry, and evening gown positioned next to a board of large
letters like that used in the "Wheel of Fortune" television game show.34 The
depiction obviously resembled Vanna White and the caption of the ad read,
"Longest running game show. 2012 A.D.," implying Samsung would be
around after a robot had replaced her.3 5 At the time, "Wheel of Fortune"
television shows in the U.S., with an estimated
ranked among the top-rated
36
35 million viewers.
White sued Samsung and Deutsch, claiming that the ad violated
California Civil Code section 3344, California's common law right of
publicity, and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1125(a), which
involves trademark infringement.37 The U.S. District Court for the Central
District ofCalifornia granted summaryjudgment against White on all causes

33

Id. at 825-26.
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 461, 463.
Colford, supra note 2.

34

Id.

30
31

32

35

Id.

36
37

White, Vanna available at http://search.biography.com (last visited January 9, 2002).
971 F.2d 1396; Lanham Trade-Mark Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a) (2001; Cal. Civ. Code

3344 (West 2001).
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of action. 38 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the dismissal of White's section 3344 claim, finding that
Samsung had not used her "likeness" within the meaning of that term as
defined by the statute by depicting a "robot with mechanical features,"
however much it appeared like White. 39 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
District Court's decisions on the common law right of publicity and false
endorsement (Lanham Act) claims, however.40 The Ninth Circuit found
that the Samsung ad evoked an image ofVanna White such that her identity
may have been appropriated, and that White raised genuine issues of material
fact regarding the likelihood of consumer confusion, such that a Lanham Act
claim could be brought.4' The majority opinion was accompanied by a
dissent prepared by Judge Alarcon. Samsung and Deutsch petitioned the
Ninth Circuit for a rehearing, which was denied, but not without strong
dissent from Judge Kozinski, who was joined by Judges O'Scannlain and
Kleinfeld. On remand, ajury awarded White $403,000 inJanuary
1994 and
42
the case was settled for that amount plus $9,000 in costs.
White establishes that a celebrity whose identity is evoked in a
commercial advertisement without consent has a right to sue the advertiser
under California's common law right of publicity and the Lanham Act to
protect that person's right to exploit the value of their celebrity identity even
when the advertisement does not make use of the celebrity's name or
likeness.4 3 The case has been viewed as a landmark decision because it
significantly expands the boundaries of a celebrity's right of publicity within
the Ninth Circuit, a property right which previously only allowed a celebrity
to seek injunctive relief and damages when another party made commercial
use of the celebrity's name, likeness, or other concrete appropriation of the
celebrity's image without consent. 44
Most pertinent to this study is the court's treatment ofWhite's common
law right of publicity claim. On that issue the court addressed several
fundamental questions. First, it considered whether name or likeness were
the only bases for pleading the common law right of publicity or, conversely,
whether identity could be appropriated by evoking a person's image through
a combination of elements that, by themselves, do not suggest the person's

38
39

971 F.2d 1396.
Id. at 1397.

40

Id. at 1399, 1401.

41

Id.

42
4
44

Vanna Wiite Hits $403,000Jackpot in Court, Chicago Tribune, January 20, 1994, at 2.

White, 971 F.3d 1395.
John R. Braatz, White v. Samsung Electronics America: The Ninth Circuit Tunis a New Letter in
California Right of Publicity Law, 15 PACE L. REV. 161, 163 (194).
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identity.4 5 Second, the court weighed the relevance of the means of
appropriation to determine if specific and enumerated means were necessary
in order for a claim to be actionable or, if instead, the means served only to
answer the question of whether the person's identity had been
appropriated. 6
In White, the Ninth Circuit decided that the common law right of
publicity should be broadly construed to protect celebrities' rights to exploit
the commercial value of their identities.47 It did so by finding that the means
of appropriation necessary to support a claim were not limited to name or
likeness; in the court's view, evocation of a celebrity's identity may suffice.48
In reaching its conclusion that the right of publicity was not restricted to the
unauthorized commercial use of a celebrity's name or likeness, the court
relied on Motschenbacher,Midler,and a Sixth Circuit decision, Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 49 in which the court held that use of "Here's
Johnny" on portable toilets by a manufacturer violated Johnny Carson's
right of publicity because of the strong association between the phrase and
the entertainer. It distinguished those cases from Eastwoodv. SuperiorCourt,5
an action brought by actor Clint Eastwood following the unauthorized use
of his photographic image and name. Samsung attempted to rely on
Eastivood to show that a right of publicity action may be pleaded only by
alleging an appropriation of name or likeness, but the White court rejected
this argument.' Instead, the "name or likeness" formulation in Eastwood
served to describe the types of cases in which a right of publicity cause of
action had been recognized, according to the court.52 In the view of Ninth
Circuit, Motschenbacher, Midler, and Carson made clear that the right of
publicity is not limited to the appropriation of name or likeness; "the
common law right of publicity is not so confined," the court concluded.53
The Ninth Circuit recognized that individual elements of the
advertisement, considered singly, did not rise to the level of an infringement
ofWhite's right ofpublicity. 4 The blond wig, large jewelry, long gown and
shape of the robot, for example, were attributes held by many women. s5

4

White, 971 F.3d at 1398.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 1399.

48

Id.

49
so
1

Carson v. Here'sJohnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
Eastwood v. Superior Court, (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
White, 971 F.2d at 1397.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 1399.

55

Id.
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Taken together, however, these features, when placed next to a "Wheel of
Fortune" style game board, clearly evoked the image of Vanna White,
supporting a claim that her identity had been appropriated . 6 "It is not
important how the defendant has appropriated the plaintiff's
identity," the
7
court held, "but whether the defendant had done so.
In support of its broad interpretation of the right of publicity, the White
court briefly examined policy considerations underlying the doctrine.
Acknowledging the labor theory of property, the court reflected on the fact
that celebrities expend "considerable energy and ingenuity" to achieve a
celebrity value that can be commercially exploited . 8 Nonetheless, even
where a public persona arises out of "dumb luck," the value inherent in the
identity is the celebrity's sole right, and the law is intended to protect that
right, the court held.59 The court also expressed concern that clever
advertisers wishing to promote their products would succeed at
appropriating a celebrity's identity even if the means of doing so in order to
support a right of publicity claim were specifically defined. 6° A broad
construction of the concept of the right of publicity was necessary, the court
reasoned, to prevent "the evisceration of the common law right of publicity
through means as facile as those in this case."6' 1
The commercial context in which White's claim arose evidently had
great bearing on the court's position. Mention of the commercial aspects
involved surfaces repeatedly throughout the opinion, arguably inferring that
the court was chiefly concerned with prohibiting unjust enrichment. Other
commentators have suggested that the court's real motive was protection of
the entertainment industry.62 A third reason for focusing on the commercial
nature of the issue presented was judicial efficiency. Doing so enabled the
court to make quick work of First Amendment concerns raised by the case
and to establish a foundation for White's Lanham Act claim.
Prior to White, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that the First
Amendment does not preclude a right of publicity claim.63 Disputes over
publicity rights implicate the First Amendment when parody is raised as a
defense against claims of infringement. Samsung made such an attempt in
the White case, relying primarily on Hustler Magazine v. Fahvel64 and L.L.
56

7

Id.

White, 971 F.2d at 1398.

58

Id. at 1399.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 1398.

61

Id. at 1399.

62
6
64

Savage, supra note 28.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,65 but the White court rejected the
argument, reasoning that the parodies involved in the precedents cited were
made for the purpose of poking fun at the plaintiffs.' By contrast, the
primary message Samsung intended to convey in its advertisement, the court
found, was "buy Samsung VCRs." 67 Commercial advertising that relies on
a celebrity's fame differs from other expressive communication, such as
parody, the court found; it is commercial speech, and is thus afforded less
protection under the First Amendment.6
The tension between the
competing interests associated with a person's right ofpublicity, the public's
right to a free exchange of ideas and information, and individual rights of
free speech and expression is examined more closely, infra, and forms the
foundation for the research questions posed.
Of secondary concern to the study is White's Lanham Act claim.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trade-MarkAct, 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) provides
that "any person who shall .. use, in connection with any goods or services
... any false description or representation.., shall be liable to a civil action
...by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the
use of any such false description or designation. "'69 The hite court was
faced with decidingwhether genuine issues of material fact existed regarding
the likelihood of consumer confusion created by the Samsung
advertisement. The court noted that White would have to prove that the
Samsung ad confused the consuming public about White's endorsement of
the company's VCRs if she was to prevail on a Lanham Act claim. 0
Applying a multi-factor balancing test fromAMF, Inc. v. SleekcraftBoats,71 the
court determined that the district court erred in rejecting White's Lanham
Act claim at the summary judgment stage.7 ' The robot ad identifies White,
the court found, and was part of a series of ads in which other celebrities
participated and were paid for their endorsement of Samsung's products. 3
White had indeed raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning a
likelihood of confusion as74 to her endorsement, and the matter should be put
to ajury, the court held.

65

L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cit. 1987).

66
67

Id.

68
69

White, 971 F.2d at 1401.
Id. at 1401 n.3.

70
71
72

Lanham Trade-Mark Act, S 43(a), 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a) (2001).
White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
White, 971 F.2d at 1401.

73

Id.

74

Id.
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A. The Dissent
Concurring in part and dissenting in part from the majority opinion in
White was Judge Alarcon, who agreed with the majority's conclusion that a
jury was not likely to find the robot in Samsung's advertisement to be a
"likeness" of White within the meaning of section 3344(a), but took issue
with the holdings rendered on the common law right of publicity and
Lanham Act claims.7' Additionally, Judge Alarcon found the majority's
analysis of Samsung's First Amendment defense to be lacking.76
Judge Alarcon was particularly troubled by the majority's abandonment
of precedent cases reciting California law and their universal
conclusion-that a right of publicity cause of action requires proof of
appropriation of a name or likeness.7 He objected to the majority's reliance
on federal cases decided after enactment of California's right of publicity
statute in 1971, asserting that a decision based onMotschenbacher,Midler,and
Carson is an undue extension of California common law, inconsistent with
the express intent of the California Legislature.78 Judge Alarcon also
maintained that the majority misapplied the holdings of the three federal
cases to the facts at hand. While it was clear that the commercial
advertisements in Motschenbacher, Midler, and Carson used identifying
attributes unique to each of the respective plaintiffs, Alarcon argued "no
reasonable juror could confuse a metal robot with Vanna White."7 9 Judge
Alarcon believed that the identifying attributes in the Samsung
advertisement were not unique to White and that the only element that
evoked her identity was the imitation "Wheel of Fortune" set, something
that was not an attribute of her identity 80° According to Judge Alarcon, the
fact that an actress became famous for playing a particular role was not
sufficient "to give the performer a propriety interest" in that role.8 '
Regarding White's Lanham Act claim, Judge Alarcon wrote that
application of the AMF test to determine the likelihood of consumer
confusion was unnecessary. s- The Lanham Act requires that White prove
actual consumer deception by Samsung in order to prevail, he reasoned, and
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White presented no such evidence. 3 Additionally, the differences between
a robot and Vanna White were so obviousJudge Alarcon contended, that no
consumer confusion could possibly occur." Judge Alarcon asserted that the
majority had wrongly looked to the AMF test to support a conclusion that
the robot depicted in the advertisement identified Vanna White. In so doing,
Judge Alarcon maintained that the fact finding function of the district court
had been usurped.8 5 Even if the AMF test was relevant, had it been applied
correctly, Judge Alarcon stated, it would have pointed to a lack of consumer
confusion, yielding no issue for trial on a Lanham Act claim. 6
The last issue Judge Alarcon challenged was the majority's analysis of
Samsung's parody defense. In Judge Alarcon's opinion, the majority's
attempt to distinguish the facts of the Hustler and L.L. Bean cases from those
presented in White was contrived, because there was sufficient similarity
between the commercial purpose of magazines depicting parodies of
ReverendJerry Falwell and L.L. Bean and the Samsung advertisement. 87 His
approach, instead, would be to look to precedent cases that allow the use of
parody without infringement as long as it satirizes the original work and
does not take more from the original than necessary to "conjure up" the
original.8
The approach borrows the "fair use" principle from the
Copyright Act 9 and turns it into a legitimate defense against a right of
publicity claim.
Judge Alarcon expressed grave concern about the cumulative effect of
the majority's opinion and its potential consequences. After White, Alarcon
feared celebrities could now sue an advertiser who depicts a role made
famous by that celebrity, and the neutering of the consumer confusion
requirement of the Lanham Act could lead to a spate of suits heretofore
prohibited.9° The proper posture for the court to strike, Judge Alarcon
argued, would be a balance that protects the unique expression of a celebrity
persona, but which stops short of granting exclusive control to celebrities,
to allow for the "creative expressions of others."9
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B. The Denial of Samisung's Petitionfor Rehearing En banc
Following the Court of Appeals ruling on White, Samsung and Deutsch
petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing and requested that the matter
be heard en banc. The petition was denied on March 18, 1993; the single
vote in favor of the petition was that of Judge Alarcon.12 The petition
provided an opportunity for Judge Alex Kozinski, joined by Judges
O'Scannlain and Kleinfeld, to pen a blistering dissent, taking issue with what
they viewed as the majority's creation of a sweeping new property right
previously unknown in California law. 93
Judge Kozinski's dissenting opinion began by acknowledging the
importance of property rights, including those involving intellectual
property, and creativity, before finding the majority guilty ofoverprotecting
these rights to a point that "stifles the very creative forces [overprotection is]
supposed to nurture."94 Judge Kozinski expressed the view that the majority
in White failed to strike the careful balance that characterizes much of
intellectual property law. 95 Instead, Vanna White was granted an exclusive
right in "what she does for a living" giving all celebrities, by extension, a
right to control "anything that reminds the viewer of [them] .,,96 Absent
from this equation, the dissent argued, was the right to parody or a fair use
exception as permitted under copyright law.97 Judge Kozinski was
convinced that these omissions not only unduly broadened the right of
publicity, they also "decimated" the federal scheme that provides for fair use
and authorized the creation or licensing of derivative works based on the
original.98 In the wake of the majority opinion, parodists would be "held
hostage" by celebrities, Kozinski reasoned, in contravention of the fair use
provisions of the Copyright Act. 99'"
Judge Kozinski's dissent also charged that the majority failed to properly
analyze First Amendment concerns presented by White. The majority's
refusal to allow Samsung to raise a parody defense because the advertisement
was commercial speech side-stepped a crucial analytical step, the dissent
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wrote, reminding the court that even commercial speech is afforded some
level of constitutional protection. 0 ' The proper approach, according to the
dissent, would have been to apply the test set out in CentralHudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,'0 2 something the majority
mentioned but quickly dismissed after finding that Samsung's parody of
White was only tangentially related to the primary purpose of selling VCRs.
In Judge Kozinski's view, the First Amendment is "about protecting the free
development of our national culture," a culture in which parody, humor,
and irreverence hold a place vital to the marketplace of ideas.'0 3
C. Subsequent History of the White Case
Following the Ninth Circuit's March 18, 1993 denial of Samsung's
petition for rehearing, Samsung petitioned for a writ of certiorari seeking
review of White by the U.S. Supreme Court. Samsung's petition was denied
on June 1, 1993.1'4 On remand from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the case went to trial and inJanuary 1994, a Los Angeles federaljury awarded
Vanna White compensatory damages of $403,000."
The parties subsequently settled; agreeing not to appeal, Samsung and Deutsch paid the full
amount of the verdict plus approximately $9,000 in legal costs, in exchange
for an agreement by White to end the litigation and let thejudgment stand.'0 6
D. Post-White Right of Publicity Law
A number of interesting cases have dotted the judicial landscape in the
years following White. Several speak to the use of the parody defense.
Others grapple with the meaning of "identity." At least three explore how
the First Amendment applies in the murky waters between commercial and
non-commercial speech, which seem to ebb and flow depending upon the
particular view of the deciding court. Although the cases described below
were heard by a cross section of the country's courts, some state and some
federal, they are all noteworthy. Interestingly, a federal court decided White.
Presumably the application of state law by a federal court must comport with
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how the law has been interpreted by the state's highest court. Until
recently, however, the California Supreme Court had not addressed the
breadth of protection afforded by the common law right of publicity. The
cases selected to show the evolution of the right of publicity are intended to
be a sample of those decisions following White that are relevant to this
research; the mentioned cases do not necessarily arise from White, nor do
they form a comprehensive list of post-white decisions involving the right
of publicity. The selected cases are set out below by category.
1. PARODY
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,' °7 the U.S. Supreme Court
considered whether "shocking" lyrics as performed by rap music group 2
Live Crew were commercial parody of Roy Orbison's song, "Oh, Pretty
Woman," fitting within the fair use meaning of the Copyright Act of
1976.08 The case represented only the second time the U.S. Supreme Court
had taken up the issue of whether parody may be a fair use. Although the
decision involved copyright infringement, it provides interesting insight into
how the Court might rule on use of a parody defense against a right of
publicity claim. The Court ultimately held that the lyrics of 2 Live Crew
were a legitimate commercial use of parody."
In deciding Campbell, the Court acknowledged the importance of
context and the need for a "sensitive balancing of interests"" ° as opposed to
relying too heavily on the commercial or non-commercial nature of the use.
Pulled in the direction of the First Amendment, the Court initially found
that "if... commerciality carried a presumptive force against a finding of
fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all ... uses.

. .

including

news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research,
since these activities are generally conducted for profit in this country.""'
A few paragraphs later, the pendulum arched the other way: "The use...
of a copyrighted work to advertise a product, even in a parody, will be
entitled to less indulgence under the... fair use enquiry than the sale of a
parody for its own sake."" 2 Some commentators have suggested that this
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statement was dictum illustrating the court's "lack of sympathy" for
advertising's use of the parody defense." 3
A Tenth Circuit decision involving the use of parody in a right of
publicity action four years after White apparently did not find White to be
persuasive. In Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n," 4 a
baseball player's organization sued a company that produced parody trading
cards featuring caricatures of baseball stars, claiming that the use infringed
upon players' rights ofpublicity. The Cardtoonscourt found that the trading
cards did more than advertise-they "expressed ideas through the use of
player identities" and had value as social commentary "on an important
social institution."" 5 Such self-expression, in the view of the court,
warranted protection. "Restricting the use of celebrity identities restricts the
communication of ideas," the majority said." 6 The court refused to be
swayed by arguments suggesting that the cards prohibited baseball players
from reaping the rewards of their labors. Remarkably, the Cardtoons court
reached its decision by reading a parody defense into Oklahoma's right of
publicity statute, something the White court clearly chose not to do.
2. IDENTITY
Closely related to White are three cases involvingjudicial interpretation
of the meaning of one's "identity." In McFarlandv. Miller,"7 an actor known
for his portrayal of "Spanky" in movie shorts and the classic "Our Gang"
television show brought suit against a New Jersey restaurant operator
claiming that the establishment's use of the actor's image and the name
"Spanky McFarland's" was an appropriation of his identity. The Third
Circuit held that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the actor had
become so inextricably identified with the name and image of Spanky
McFarland that their use would invoke his identity." 8 In so holding, the
McFarland court looked to White for support. The court noted that
"[a]lthough White did not own the show that created the association
[between celebrity and product], the [White] court held that she possessed
the image invoked."" 9 The majority interpreted the White decision as
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recognizing that "without identification, the right of publicity is
worthless." 120 The McFarlandcourt concluded, "The right of publicity is a
proprietary right based on the identity of a character or defining trait that
becomes associated with a person when he gains notoriety or fame.
McFarland developed an exploitable interest to which he may lay claim if he
can persuade a fact finder that he has become identified with the name
Spanky."21
In two more recent cases producing opposing outcomes, the Sixth
Circuit refused to recognize an actor's right of publicity while the Ninth
Circuit favored the aggrieved performers. Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys,
Inc. 122 involved an actor's claim against a toy manufacturer and a film
production company for the appropriation of his identity without
permission. The actor had appeared as "Billy, the Native American Tracker"
in the movie Predator,and the film company had subsequently licensed the
rights to develop a line of toys based on the movie to Galoob.' 23 Galoob
produced a "Billy" action figure, which Landham claimed violated his right
of publicity under Kentucky law. 124 Statutory protection of the right of
publicity in Kentucky extends to the "appropriation of some element of an
individual's personality for commercial exploitation." 2 s To decide the case,
the Sixth Circuit looked extensively into the case law surrounding the right
of publicity, on the basis that such cases are rare and doing so was necessary
to maintain uniformity in intellectual property laws.'26
For the Landham court, the claim came down to two fundamental
questions. First was the issue of whether Galoob would gain significant
commercial value by associating an item of commerce, i.e. the toy, with the
plaintiffs identity. 2 7 To establish this, Landham would need to present
evidence that he was both known by the public and the public associated
him with the role he played. The court held that Landham proved
neither.'28 Furthermore, it was necessary that Landham show that the
"Billy" toy invoked his persona. 129 The court found that the 1.5 inch tall toy,
which had neither eyes nor mouth, did not bear any resemblance to
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Landham.'3 Further, although exploitation of a fictional character was
occasionally possible, the focus of a right of publicity analysis, the court
asserted, must always be on the actor's own persona and not the
character's. 3' Thus, the Landhatn court declined to follow White. White was
distinguishable, the court reasoned, because Vanna White used her own
name in her television role and produced evidence that her identity was
invoked and had commercial value.' 32 Landham lost his right of publicity
claim on appeal. SidingwithJudge Kozinski, the Sixth Circuit expressed its
unwillingness to "give every individual who appears before a television or
movie camera . . . the right as a matter of law to compensation for every
subtle nuance that may be taken by someone as invoking his identity without
first being required to prove significant commercial value and
identifiability."131
A 1997 decision, Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,134 underscores the
tenacity of the Ninth Circuit in upholding the expansive approach to right
of publicity law that earned it the designation of "court of appeals for the
Hollywood circuit" by one columnist. 3 5 In Wendt, two actors of the 1980s
television series "Cheers" sued Host International on the basis of its
placement of a pair of animatronic robots modeled after the actors in its6
13
airport bars which were decorated in a motif made popular by the show.
Paramount Pictures Corporation, which owns the copyright to "Cheers" and
its characters, had licensed the concept to Host International, but the two
actors had not consented to the use of their likenesses, which they claimed
were portrayed by the robots. 37 As the case unfolded, it became clear that
the District Court and the Ninth Circuit held differing views about how
California's common law and statutory rights of publicity should be
interpreted. The District Court initially granted summaryjudgment to Host
International after comparing photographs of the actors and the robots,
finding no likeness between the two. 3 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that the District Court should have compared the "actual, threedimensional" forms of the robots to the actors. 39 On remand, the District
130
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Court once again found no similarity other than the fact that one of the
robots was heavy and the other slight, as were the plaintiffs; the defendant's
motion for summaryj udgment was granted for a second time. 40 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the lower court's assessment of whether a
likeness existed between the robots and plaintiffs. Remanding the case for
second time, the Ninth Circuit ordered a jury trial. 14' Host International
petitioned for review by the U.S. Supreme Court, which declined to hear
the case. 42 The case, first filed in 1993, was finally settled inJune 2001 for
an undisclosed amount. 43
3. FIRST AMENDMENT
Tension between the right of publicity and the First Amendment rights
of free speech and expression continued to surface in the years following
White. Over the last three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has vacillated
on the amount of protection that should be afforded commercial speech.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has protected it only grudgingly, and Justices
Stevens and Thomas have come down on the side of protecting it to the
same degree as editorial speech.'" In general, the Court has struck a balance
between these two perspectives using the Central Hudson 4 test, which
provides limited protection for commercial speech. CentralHudson lays out
a four-prong test that must be met if a restriction of commercial speech,
such as that imposed by the right of publicity, is to pass First Amendment
scrutiny. The requirements are: 1) the speech must be neither misleading
nor unlawful; 2) the government must assert a substantial interest in support
of the restrictive regulation; 3) the restriction must directly and materially
advance the government's interest, and 4) the restriction must be narrowly
drawn.'46 The test still provides a fair amount of latitude for judicial
interpretation, however, and in some cases a finding that the speech involved
was noncommercial blocks its application entirely. An example of this is
Comedy III Productions,Inc. v. Gary Saterup, Inc., 47 which stands apart as one
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of the few cases where a court attempted to reconcile the right of publicity
with First Amendment rights.
a. The Comedy III Case
In Comedy III, an artist sold lithographs and T-shirts bearing a likeness
of The Three Stooges, which were reproduced from his own original,
charcoal drawings, without the consent of Comedy III Productions, the
registered owner of the former comedy act.148 Comedy III brought an action
for violation of the publicity rights of the deceased personalities and
prevailed. The artist appealed, contendingthat enforcement ofthejudgment
against him would violate his First Amendment rights of free speech and
expression. On review, the California Supreme Court found the artist's
portraits of The Three Stooges to be expressive works rather than an
advertisement or product endorsement, and noted that "[an expressive
activity] does not lose its constitutional protection because it is undertaken
for profit."149 Commercial speech was not implicated, the court held,
thereby placing the lithographs and T-shirts in a category afforded
substantial First Amendment protection.' s° It did not automatically follow,
though, that the right of publicity had been trumped. The court said,
"[B]ut having recognized the high degree of First Amendment protection
for noncommercial speech about celebrities, we need not conclude that all
expression that trenches on the right of publicity receives such
protection.""' In fact, the Court ultimately held for Comedy III
Productions, holding that "depictions of celebrities amounting to little more
than the appropriation of the celebrity's economic value are not protected
expression under the First Amendment."" 2
To reach its decision, the California Supreme Court formulated a
balancing test between the right of publicity and the First Amendment. The
test borrowed from copyright law, adopting the first factor in the "fair use
test"-the purpose and character of the use-which the Court found
"particularly pertinent" in resolving the tension between the two competing
doctrines.5 3 In so doing, the Court looked to Campbell, and embraced the
concept of transformative use. For a finding of fair use, the court held, the
inquiry should center on "whether a product containing a celebrity's likeness
148 Id. at 393.
149
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is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant's own
expression rather than the celebrity's likeness." 4 Applyingthe new test, the
Comedy III court found that the artist's work was not sufficiently
transformative to be protected by the First Amendment. 155 In effect, the
decision introduces a new criterion into a right of publicity case-the
inquiry into whether a work containing a celebrity image is "transformative"
enough to warrant protection under the First Amendment.' 56
b. The Hoffman Case
Several months later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Hoffman v. CapitalCities/ABC, Inc.,157 in which a celebrity sought to recover
in a right of publicity action against a magazine and its publisher claiming
that his photograph was used to create a computer-generated image of him
fashionably dressed in designer women's clothes, which appeared in Los
Angeles Magazine. A central issue of the case was whether the magazine's
use of the plaintiff s image constituted commercial speech; on this point the
district court and the Court of Appeals disagreed. 158 The image in question
was a still photograph from the movie "Tootsie" featuring actor Dustin
Hoffman. The magazine had retained the actor's head but substituted the
body of a male model wearing a silk evening dress and high-heeled
sandals. 59 The Ninth Circuit held that since the use was not in a traditional
advertisement printed to sell a particular product, it was not pure
commercial speech.' 6 The magazine's editorial expression was therefore
entitled to "full First Amendment protection. A6 The Hoffman court
distinguished White as a case where "the defendant used an aspect of the
celebrity's identity entirely and directly for the purpose of selling a product."
In this instance at least, the right of publicity had given way to the First
Amendment despite the fact that the "Shopper's Guide" in the magazine
issue with the actor's image provided store locations and prices for the gown
and sandals worn by the plaintiff.162
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c. The Montana Case
A California Court of Appeal case, Montana v. San Jose Mercury News,
Inc.,16 also involved the gray area between commercial and noncommercial
uses, the right of publicity, and the First Amendment. InMontana, a football
player brought an action against a newspaper for the commercial
misappropriation of his name, photograph, and likeness) 64 Newspaper
pages depicting the player had been reproduced for sale in poster form, and
the plaintiff argued that the newspaper had used his identity solely to extract
commercial value from it.165 The Court of Appeal held that the First
Amendment protected the posters "because the posters themselves report
newsworthy items of public interest... and... because a newspaper has a
constitutional right to promote itself by reproducing its originally protected
articles or photographs."(' In a footnote, the Court explained that the fact
that the posters were sold was not significant; "[t] he First Amendment is not
limited to those who publish without charge," the Court said.' 67
V. RESTATEMENT

Another significant post-White development was the American Law
Institute's adoption of a broad definition of the right of publicity.
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 states "[o]ne who
appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using without
consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of
trade is subject to liability..." (emphasis added)."6 Comment (d) explains,
"whether the plaintiff is identified by the defendant's use is a question of
fact. In the absence of a narrower statutory definition, a number of cases
have held that the unauthorized use of other indicia of a person's identity
can infringe the right of publicity."' 69 Some commentators have expressed
concern that the Restatement "creates a cause of action in virtually any
situation where something featured in advertising reminds the public of a
celebrity," and that while long on effect, it is short on guidance, giving no
indication of "how much, if any, of a celebrity's identity may be used
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70
without permission."A
Like the White decision, the Restatement makes no
provision for the use of a parody defense. To the extent courts find the
Restatement persuasive, an expanded view of the right of publicity may gain
a firmer foothold in case law.

VI. THEORIES AND ISSUES PRESENTED BY WHITE

The White decision prompted an outpouring ofcriticism beginningwith
the dissenting opinions of Judges Alarcon and Kozinski. It was not long
before it percolated throughout the legal community; in the decade
following White, commentators characterized the Ninth Circuit ruling as a
landmark decision, taking issue with it for a variety of reasons.17' Much of
the criticism fits neatly into four main categories.
Drawing the most fire was the White court's abbreviated treatment of
First Amendment concerns raised by the case. As the court approached a
major intersection between the right of publicity and First Amendment
rights of free speech and expression, it accelerated, even though the light was
changing from yellow to red. Commentators rebuked the Ninth Circuit by
asserting that a "fair use" parody defense should have been allowed or that
the CentralHudson test should have been applied.'72 At the heart of the First
Amendment arguments are: 1) the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech, and 2) the amount of constitutional protection
afforded to each. While many proponents of First Amendment rights argue
that an evocable right of publicity is an impermissible restriction on
commercial speech, others are less convinced.' 73 Some commentators find
the focus on commercial and noncommercial speech to be somewhat
misplaced, arguing for an examination of underlying policy considerations
and judicial balance.174 To these individuals, the relevant question is how to
protect personalities from appropriation while preserving expression
in the
1 7
form of parody, satire, and self-conscious impersonation. 5
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In a practical sense, arguments over the type of speech involved and the
degree of protection warranted can logically be extended to encompass
control and suppression of information and ideas. White was cast, therefore,
as being overprotective, giving celebrities too much control over the use of
their identities.' 76 Shortchanged in the process were creativity, creative
expression, and cultural richness and vitality, according to legal scholars,
commentators, and members of the advertising industry. 17V When this issue
is examined more narrowly, some commentators maintain that context is
important in deciding whether artistic expression and the communication
of ideas have been compromised. Many transactions between buyer and
seller, they conclude, contribute little, if anything, to the marketplace of
ideas. Under this reasoning, purely exploitative uses such as identity-backed
merchandising should not be given First Amendment protection. Other
uses of celebrity identity may offer entertainment value. The extent to
which a particular use is "creative" or has "entertainment value" ultimately
is in the eye of the beholder. The most controversial aspects of the White
decision, then, may be attributable to the nature of the rights involved,
diverging views about the social value of a particular use and the manner in
which it is conveyed, and the uncertainty that swirls in the wake of the
Ninth Circuit's ruling.
Clearly, many view the White decision as being too open-ended, leaving
future courts without sufficient guidance. Opponents of the ruling argue
that celebrity "identity" is now without limits and that it is impossible to
predict those "indicia" of a person's identity that potentially could be found
evocative of their persona.'78 Further, advertisers must now attempt to
discern where the line is drawn between mere evocation of identity and
appropriation of the associative value of that identity to avoid violating a
person's right of publicity. 79 In a few short pages, White shatters the
predictability and guidance of prior publicity law, some commentators
claim.' ° It does this by simultaneously expanding the property defined by
the right of publicity, which some argue now extends beyond name or
likeness to include what a celebrity "does for a living," while eroding the
requirements necessary to show that a celebrity's identity has been evoked.' 8'
176
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Lastly, White has been viewed as undermining intellectual property rights
and contradicting federal copyright law. Copyright law specifically gives the
world at large the right to make "fair use" of the original work, uses that
don't borrow too much from the original.' 82 It also gives the copyright
owner the exclusive right to create (or license the creation of) derivative
works, which include parodies that borrow too much to qualify as "fair
use.,,3, 1

The essential limitations found in intellectual property law were

wrongly omitted from the expanded property right created by White, it has
been argued, and doing so "impoverishes the public domain to the detriment
of future creators and the public at large." 8 5 Without a fair use exception or
right to parody, property covered by the right of publicity is essentially
overprotected, thwarting one ofthe goals ofthe intellectual property system.
Copyright law strikes a balance between protecting original expressions and
encouraging others to freely build upon ideas conveyed by the original work.
By contrast, the White decision provides no such encouragement, but rather
provides celebrities with the means to keep socially enriching uses of identity
out of the public domain. 8 6
The White decision poses several interesting research issues, two of
which are addressed by this study. Broadly, the research objective was to
examine the real world impact of White, to determine if the predicted
outcomes-either those advanced by the court or by legal scholars-were
eventually realized. The fact that nearly a decade has elapsed since the court
ruling in White facilitates such an analysis. Research issues selected for
investigation center around the effect ofWite on the advertising community
and the claim that the expansion of publicity rights would be accompanied
by a restriction of creativity. Specifically, the first question probed is the
extent to which advertising agencies changed the way they do business
following White. Subparts to this issue include investigating the amount of
attention the decision received by advertising executives and eliciting their
view on whether the creative process has been stifled by the decision. The
second question probed is whether there has been a decline in the use of
parody as a means of creative expression in print advertising as a result of
White. The scope of the inquiry on this second question has been limited
because an exhaustive review of print advertising in the U.S. before and after
1992 would exceed the time available for the conduct of this study.
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In part, the research was undertaken to test theoretical propositions that:
1) advertisers have been impacted by White and the line of publicity rights
cases of which White is a part; 2) the creative process has been compromised
or restricted by these decisions; and 3) the use of celebrity parody in print
advertisements produced by advertising agencies in the U.S. has changed as
a result of White. Together, these hypotheses form a template for the
analysis of the data collected. Empirical results are compared with the
propositions advanced, and a combination of inductive and deductive
analysis is used to conduct the evaluation.
VII. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODS, DATA SOURCES AND
ANALYTICAL APPROACH

The primary purpose of this empirical research study is to gain insight
into how typical members of the advertising community in the U.S. reacted
to the decision by the White court. To accomplish that objective, the
research relies on a mix of measurement, design, and analytical approaches.
The research design is largely a naturalistic inquiry into a real world situation
using qualitative methods.'87 Some methodological triangulation is achieved,
however, through incorporation of a quantitative component. Design of the
study is longitudinal; both the qualitative and quantitative segments of the
study examine events and behavior before and after the White decision,
covering a period from 1980 to 2002. The analytical approach is principally
a holistic/inductive one, but some deductive analysis is included to permit
closer focus on data emerging due to the study's partially open-ended design.
Qualitative methods form the backbone of the study. Multiple forms
of data are used to improve reliability and provide cross-data validity checks.
The bulk of the data come from qualitative interviews. Here, the units of
analysis are advertising agency executives, and a "typical case" sampling
strategy is used.18 Purposeful sampling that targets individual advertising
executives with substantial industry experience enables the study to rely on
relatively small sample size. Sampling technique consisted of telephone and
in-person interviews approximately 20 minutes in length using four types of
non-standardized open-ended questions: 1) knowledge; 2) experience; 3)
opinion; and 4) background." a Interviews were conducted with seven
different senior advertising executives having a collective total of 124 years
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of industry experience." 9 Small, medium, and large advertising agencies
were represented by the sample. 9' A personal interview was also conducted
with an attorney at the firm that represented Vanna White in her action
against Samsung.' 92 Other qualitative data sources used in the study
included newspaper articles, related stories appearing in trade publications,
and published legal reference materials aimed at the advertising industry.
Documentary material covering a period from 1980 to 2002 was reviewed
to illuminate advertising industry awareness of right of publicity issues.
Electronic news and information service databases were searched, as were
media and communication databases, which included the advertising
industry's leading publications, such as Advertising Age and Adweek.
The quantitative component of the study primarily relied on archival
research. To compare the relative prevalence of print advertisements
featuring celebrities before and after the White decision, and the use of
parody in print advertising, a comprehensive review of two electronic print
advertising repositories was conducted. Adflip L.L.C. maintains "the world's
largest searchable database of classic print advertisements" in electronic
format. Advertisements in the Adflip database are catalogued by decade,
facilitating a review of 1,128 magazine ads from the 1980s (pre-White) and
532 from the 1990s (post-White). In addition, custom research was
undertaken with AdForum, which maintains a repository of over 15,000
print advertisements. A search of the AdForum database produced 15
examples of the use of parody in recent print advertising campaigns.
Secondarily, an informal review of the catalogued contents of The Sandra &
Gary Baden Collection of Celebrity Endorsements in Advertising was
conducted to gain an appreciation for the number and type of endorsements
occurring in high end print magazines between 1897 and 1979.193
The study as constructed has several inherent limitations. The small
sample size, for example, makes it difficult to generalize the interview
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TBWA/Chiat/Day, Los Angeles, CA; John Hage, Publicis/Hal Riney, San Francisco, CA; Rick Colby,
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results. Although the executives interviewed were located at agencies of
various sizes, their industry experience often was accumulated across
multiple employers, thereby preventing any correlation between agency size
and changes in company policy with respect to right of publicity issues
following White. Additionally, the use of nonstandardized questions raises
the possibility of inadvertent introduction of bias during interviewing,
despite best attempts by the interviewer to maintain objectivity.
There were other limitations associated with the quantitative data
collected. The archival advertising databases reviewed were extensive but
not complete. As a result, inferences drawn were based on a representative
sample ofprint advertisements that appeared in magazines between 1980 and
2002, as opposed to the known universe of all such ads during this period.
Undoubtedly, significant variability exists between collections with respect
to the amount of celebrity advertising they contain, depending upon the
source, and this could potentially bias the study results. Similar issues arise
with respect to the documentary materials reviewed. Electronic searches for
news and trade articles cautioning against evocation of celebrity identities
were conducted via Westlaw, and results were obviously limited by the
breadth of publications contained in those databases and the availability of
pre-1990 information in electronic format.
Custom research on the use of parody in print advertising was largely
based on a search of the AdForum database conducted by the company's
employees between January 10-23, 2002. Before conducting the research,
AdForum explained that their archives did not have a classification for
"parody." Search techniques were random, guided only by employee recall,
and this, too, may have introduced bias with respect to the occurrence of
celebrity parody during the time period examined. Although the
quantitative and custom research shed some light on the incidence ofparody
in print advertising, the study stops short of determining whether such use
occurred with or without authorization by the person who was the subject
of the parody.
VII. RESEARCH RESULTS

The first step in gauging the impact of the White decision on the
advertising industry was to assess the level of industry awareness and
knowledge about right of publicity issues generally, in the decade preceding
the decision. A review of the pre-White electronic media was the primary
means used to establish a baseline, and information gleaned from interviews
with advertising executives, many of whom have had an extended career in
the industry, was used to supplement these findings.
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The research findings show that the right of publicity-while not highly
publicized-received periodic press coverage throughout the 1980s, and that
this coverage came to the attention of advertising executives. A marketing
campaign for personal computers conducted by IBM serves as a prominent
example from this period. In May 1984, the Wall StreetJournaltook note of
the issues raised by IBM's use of a Charlie Chaplin look-alike in its
advertising campaign, reporting that right of publicity law was "still fuzzy,"
particularly with respect to whether the right passed to survivors of celebrity
entertainers. 194 At the time, the California Legislature was considering
amendment of the State's right of publicity statute to extend protection to
the families of deceased personalities."'9 Other articles, prompted by similar
legislative activity in New York and court actions elsewhere, peppered the
press throughout the mid to late 1980s.19 An example of fairly extensive
coverage of this topic is a Neivsday story of March 31, 1988.197
The Midler case in 1989 substantially elevated the right of publicity
among advertising agencies, positioning it prominently on their radar
screens. News reports at the time characterized advertisers as being "wary"
of copying popular singers' styles in the wake of Midler, but noted, "the
attraction to the familiar is hard to break." 198 As a result, agencies face the
choice of "rein [ing] in their creativity or playing "jingle roulette," the report
suggested." 9 In open-ended questioning about their awareness of the scope
of the right of publicity, advertising executives invariably made unprompted
mention of the Midler case. Back Stage magazine observed that the soundalike trend had peaked in 1985, some four years before Midler, as "ad
agencies and their clients turned to sound-alikes after they saw that popular
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music, especially rock, was an acceptable and effective way to tap into the
consciousness oftheir target demographic groups." 200 "T h e [Midler] decision
surprised a lot of people," one advertising executive observed, "it changed
advertising dramatically."20 ' Other interviewees echoed this opinion.0 2
The Midler case once again drew the attention of the media when a
verdict of $400,000 was upheld in 1992.03 In reporting the Midler outcome,
news accounts summarized other successful right of publicity actions
brought by celebrities including the Beatles, Tom Waits, Carlos Santana, and
Chris Isaak. 2°4 The message to advertisers and their clients seemed
unmistakable. One entertainment law attorney put it this way "[t]he Bette
Midler ruling is a clear and logical extension of the direction that the law
protecting the intangible rights of celebrities.has been heading for the last
decade. But what the entertainment community is waiting to see is how far
the court is prepared to go in expanding the concept. "205 The entertainment
community did not have to wait long; just months following the
announcement of Midler's verdict, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in
White.
The White case was followed by the general media as well as the
advertising trade press, undoubtedly keeping the right of publicity in the
peripheral vision of ad agencies and their clients.2°
Interestingly,
interspersed throughout this period-are trade reports of Vanna White's
professional activities, including a $25,000 deal with cellular telephone
manufacturer NEC for the use of her hands in a print advertisement with
the theme line "Designed for the greatest hands in the world: Especially

Jeffrey, supra note 198. The article went on to say "young people identify with pop music
celebrities, who were.being viewed by advertisers as great potential pitchmen. If you couldn't get an
actual celebrity to sing on your spot, you could hire someone who sounded like him or her and hope to
create the same kind of emotional connection the artist had with his audience."
01
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Izenstark has 20 years of experience in advertising and formerly was with the NewYork office ofYoung
& Rubicam, the agency that was aco-defendant with Ford Motor Company in Midler, when the case was
decided (the Ford account was handled by Y&R, Detroit).
202
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yours" 2 7 and the $20 million in sales resulting from her endorsement of
Perfect Smile tooth whitener.0 8 Not only were ad agencies reading about
the court's expansive interpretation of the right of celebrity, they were being
reminded ofjust how valuable that right was worth to Vanna White.
Coverage of other right of publicity actions continued in the industry
press in the decade following White. Many of the articles that appeared
carried words of caution to agencies and advertisers, not unlike the warnings
that accompanied press accounts of the Midler case. Advertisers were told
"the threat of lawsuits is real, ' 2° there was "no poaching on celebrities, 210
and that "sound-alike was a bad word in adland."2' The message regarding
the right of publicity, while perhaps no more pronounced in the post-White
years, had certainly become more refined. Trade publications often advised
agencies to obtain consent from celebrities and to check with counsel before
attempting to use a celebrity's name, image or likeness.2 12' 213 A legal
reference guide for advertising executives published in the mid-1990s
devoted a chapter to the rights of privacy and publicity. 214 Celebrity rights
were characterized as "murky waters" where the law was "fuzzy" and
"inconsistent. 215 Still, "every aspect ofa personality's image is controllable"
advertisers were warned 216 and agencies should buy insurance to protect
themselves and hire attorneys to screen proposed ads.217 Added to the line
of cases meriting the industry's attention were right of publicity actions
brought by well-known celebrities such as Dustin Hoffman, actors George
Wendt and John Ratzenberger of the Cheers television show, sports star
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, and other noteworthy personalities.
By 2001, the court's willingness to side with the entertainment industry
on right of publicity issues appeared to wane slightly, and the press took note
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of the change. When Hoffman v. CapitalCities/ABC, Inc.2"' was overturned,
attorneys on both sides of the issue acknowledged the decision as "quietly
sensational" and "a sea change in where the law has been."2 9 Although
Hoffman was viewed by one commentator as a "great victory for the media
and the 1st Amendment against efforts by celebrities to control how they are
depicted or referred to in the media," the researcher was unable to locate any
reports at the time suggesting that the courts might reverse the trend that
began with Midler and White.
Quantitative data was collected to gain insight into the use of celebrity
personalities in print advertising throughout the 1900s, but particularly
during the 1980s and 1990s (pre- and post-hite) and the relative occurrence
of parody as a communications technique during the past two decades. A
review of the catalogued contents of The Sandra & Gary Baden Collection
of Celebrity Endorsements in Advertising showed that the use of celebrity
personalities in print advertising has a rich history.2 0 A total of 1429 print
ads appear in the collection, gleaned from high-end magazines such as
Fortune,McCalls, Playbill, and Vogue between 1897 and 1979. There is a wide
variation in the product endorsed, but cigarettes, beauty products, and
electronics figure prominently in the collection. Although the ads contained
in the collection were noted and tallied, the review does little more than
confirm that celebrity personalities have long been valued by advertisers
utilizing print media to convey their message.221
A comprehensive review of all print advertisements from the 1980s and
1990s contained in Adflip's searchable electronic database supplemented
these general observations. Of the 1128 print ads in Adflip's database from
the 1980s, five percent or 59 ads featured celebrities. Six of the 59
advertisements were parodies. Examples of celebrity endorsements include
the appearance of football player Joe Theismann and tennis star John
Newcombe in advertisements for Canon cameras, and the use of parody is
illustrated by a print advertisement Reggie Jackson did for Panasonic car
stereos.2222 The most well known example of parody in print advertising
from this period, however, is IBM Corporation's use of a Charlie Chaplin
218
219
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look-alike to introduce its new line of personal computers in the early
1980s.223 By comparison, a review of all of the print advertisements
contained in the Adflip database covering the 1990s-532 in total-yielded
only four celebrity endorsements, or less than one percent of those in the
collection. Interestingly, there were no parodies in the 1990s collection of
print ads maintained by Adflip. Nonetheless, the use of parody is still alive
and well in print advertising in the new millennium. Custom research
performed by AdForum produced 15 current print ads utilizing parody to
convey the advertiser's message, 10 of which ran in the U.S.; all but one of
the ads, however, featured either political figures or deceased celebrities.224
The apparent decline of celebrity endorsements in print advertising
coincides with a "boom" in advertising during the 1990s attributable to the
rise of the technology industry. "A vast amount of the investment capital
that was thought to be pumping up the new economy ended up instead
pumping up the revenues of billboard owners, broadcasters and publishers,"
according to one writer, who continued "all you had to do was pick up any
of the new business economy magazines ...
to notice where a lot of venture
capital was ending up. " 22 5 Despite conflicting reports that magazine
advertising has taken a recent downturn, not in dispute is the health of the
magazine industry, which continued to flourish during the 1990s.
The principle body of research findings derives from qualitative
interviews conducted with senior advertising industry executives. The seven
interviewees had an average of 17.7 years of experience in the advertising
industry, and agency size ranged from $40 million to $1.4 billion in annual
-billings. Three small firms, two medium-size firms, and two large firms
were represented by the sample. z 6
Results from the interviews can be combined into five broad categories:
1) awareness of White and related right of publicity issues; 2) characterization
of risks associated with celebrity campaigns or parodies; 3) the right of
publicity's infringement upon agency creativity; 4) the use of parody and
celebrity personas in advertising; and 5) the impact, if.any, of Jhiteon how
the agency operates. Obviously, there is considerable overlap between
categories and interviews did not address each topic independent of the
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others; classification here is simply the means chosen to present the findings
in an orderly fashion.
The interviews revealed that awareness of right of publicity issues was
high among senior advertising executives, but four of the seven interviewees
were only vaguely acquainted with the White case despite having extensive
advertising industry experience. By contrast, each of the interviewees was
familiar with the Midler decision. In fact, voice impersonations or the use of
a particular piece of music made popular by a famous vocalist often surfaced
as examples of business issues most frequently associated with the right of
publicity. All of those interviewed had some interaction with celebrities or
their agents. One interviewee offered that working with celebrities is "a
nightmare" primarily because of the egos involved. "They are used to being
treated with kid gloves and are not afraid to walk all over an idea," he said,
"many of them look down at advertising as the weaker media." 227 Another
executive had a different view. "People invest a lot of money in developing
their personalities, and they need to protect it [sic]" he said, using Martha
has created a persona over time,
Stewart as an example of someone who
228
eventually becoming "a corporation."
Experience with celebrity right of publicity or copyright issues had left
an indelible mark on each of the parties interviewed. In general, all admitted
to being wary of any use of a celebrity's identity that might be construed as
an infringement on the right of publicity. One interviewer noted, "in any
type of creative production you always have the risk of being sued by
someone... [it is said that] there are only seven stories out there. But Y&R
probably felt the risk [of Bette Midler suing] was low when they developed
the Ford ad." 229 Smaller agencies may have little to lose, another executive
suggested, which may embolden them. "If they receive a cease and desist
letter [after encroaching upon someone's publicity rights], theyjust pull the
ad," he said.m For companies like DDB Chicago or TBWA/Chiat/Day, the
pockets are much deeper. Executives interviewed from these two agencies
had both been involved in lawsuits arising out of advertising campaigns they
developed. "Chiat has been burned," one interviewer said, referring to its
use of a Barbie look-alike in a television commercial that prompted toy
2M
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manufacturer Mattel to take legal action. 231 DDB Chicago found itself
alongside client McDonald's in a copyright infringement action brought by
a famous fashion photographer that arose from one of its ads.2- 2 Each
individual interviewed recalls a situation involving the use of a piece of
music, image, or aspect of a celebrity's persona that necessitated risk
mitigation in the production phase of advertising. The words of one
interview seem to sum it up well: "over time we've become more wary, with
more people looking at it [ad production] saying "Can we do that?" 233
Unlike opinions about risk, there was no consensus among those
interviewed regarding the extent to which, if at all, the right of publicity
stifled agency creativity. Four of the participants234 stated that the creative
process was not compromised out of concern over the potential
infringement of someone's right of publicity, two23 s maintained that
celebrity power to control the message was definitely limiting, and one
found the threat of right of publicity actions to be somewhat stifling. 236 It is
noteworthy that all of the interviewees spoke with considerable conviction
on this topic. Those who felt that agency creativity remained unfettered in
the decade following White were as firmly entrenched in their position as
those who opined that the right of publicity was a constraint on creativity.
For example, one executive emphatically stated "it [concern about publicity
rights] doesn't stifle us at all"2-7 and another said, "I can't think of one time
that it has hampered us."238
Two executives who generally felt
unconstrained offered a slightly more qualified perspective. "I don't think
it [publicity rights] ever inhibits us creatively," one person observed, "a
campaign may end up somewhat different than where you thought it was
going [during the creative process], but that doesn't mean it is less strong,
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creatively." 39 This was echoed in other interviews. "As far as concepting,
I don't find it limiting," one interviewee reported.2" Another offered "I will
not restrict the creatives [team members] that work with me; I let them
come up with any idea, but we might weed it out later. 241
Several of the interviewees unequivocally asserted that celebrities'
publicity rights confined the creative process. "Any time we think of using
a celebrity's name or likeness, the lawyers put the kibosh on it very quickly.
It gets very stifling," one executive stated. 242 "I will shut it [a creative idea
that potentially infringes on the right of publicity] down before it even gets
to the attorneys. We all have limited time, so you have to edit yourself. I'm
not about to take an idea all the way through the creative process, including
testing it out with focus groups, to have a problem develop," he continued.243
As an example, the executive described a documentary style television
commercial that his agency filmed that relied on "off the cuff" interviews
with ordinary people. When one person said, "living in a tree house makes
me feel like Tarzan," the spot was scrapped. "We couldn't use it," he
explained. "It wasn't demeaning, and it is unlikely that it would have been
2
an infringement, but one could argue that Tarzan might have a claim." "
Another executive observed, "we used to do it [create advertising that
derived something 4from a celebrity's persona] a lot, but we stopped. It is
2
definitely stifling."
One of the interviewees found the right of publicity to be an obstacle
only in certain circumstances. "It is a function of how much the idea is
dependent upon the celebrity himself, instead ofjust overall tonality. If the
celebrity is integral to the advertisement, we often have to make 180 degree
turns," he said.246 "Actually, it is somewhat stifling," the executive
concluded.24 7
Few of those interviewed expressed much enthusiasm for the use of
parody as an advertising technique. Reasons for this were mixed. One
executive found parody to be "difficult to pull off in print," explaining that
the process involved "taking a message developed by a well-polished ad
agency and putting a spin on it by another well polished ad agency." 24 "For
239
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it to work, you have to split the communication message," he said, "you have
to devote some energy to establishing context, before you can put the spin
on it."249 Citing parodies targeting the tobacco industry as examples, the
executive noted that parodies are often "strong and, by their nature, cynical,"
a means ofcommunication having limited application.0 ° Parody often pokes
fun at public officials, one executive observed, recalling an advertisement for
Infinity that mimicked the voice of former President Bill Clinton. 51
"[When I heard it] I remember thinking: I wonder how they did that?," he
reflected, "or are people in public office fair game? ", 252 The interviewee
more
characterized this as a "grey area" noting that a parody might draw
23
attention and possibly a lawsuit, "particularly if it is in bad taste. 5
Several of those interviewed had experiences with parody-based
advertising that seemed to go poorly. "It has been the thorniest area in my
career," one executive admitted, recalling a failed attempt to use a soundalike impersonator to parody a well-known celebrity. 254 Another executive
acknowledged parodying a genre-public service announcements-but said
that in general, "we've tried to steer away from that kind of stuff
[parodies].,255
Interestingly, one interviewee thought that parody was "safer" than the
direct appropriation of a celebrity's persona. 2 6 "Parody happens all of the
time," he observed, "ad agencies often adopt an ultra-conservative approach,
but some clients don't care [about taking risks]. "257 "The risk involved
depends on the celebrity's status. Those who are less well known, like cable
network personalities on low rating shows, are less likely to sue. [They
know that] in court, the first thing they would have to prove is their
celebrity status," the executive said.2 5s
According to several of the interviewees, the use of celebrities in print
advertising has declined. 259 "Broadcast media still rely on celebrity
spokespersons to create a brand image," one executive observed, "but in
print you could take the same money and put it against your brand and get
more out of it. Before, all you needed was a sports figure, but that doesn't
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always work today. Advertising has become more sophisticated."2 °
Accounting for the movement away from celebrities in situations where
advertising budgets are limited, is in part, the fact that "you never know what
you will get. Joe Namath isn't perfect." 26' The interviewee went on to
explain that an advertiser could create a strong association between a
celebrity and the advertised product, only to find later that some incident
that tarnished the celebrity's image had a negative impact on product sales.
"I'm not a big fan of using celebrities in advertising," another executive said,
"although we've had some successful celebrity campaigns for major clients,
such as Apple Computers."
Generally, the interviewees suggested that instances where an advertising
agency contemplated using some aspect of a celebrity's identity or persona
without ever attempting to secure that person's permission are relatively
rare. Several executives pointed to campaigns conducted in limited markets
for local clients as examples. In one case, Wieden & Kennedy produced an
outdoor advertisement for a small Oregon bank that was pulled after three
weeks following receipt of an objection from Martha Stewart.262 The
interviewee explained: "You must askyourself, what is the likelihood that a
person [whose rights may have been infringed] is going to find out? In
California, anything put in the L.A. market is sure to be seen by a celebrity
or that person's agent, whereas in a satellite area, perhaps not. You must also
look at the celebrity's history. Some may never consent to advertising in the
states, but will agree to uses of their persona in overseas markets." 263
"Today, the internet has changed everything with respect to exposure,"
another executive noted.264 "Before, you had tight control over where your
message appeared. Now it [your ad] can show up on the internet and be
26
downloaded, giving millions of people access to what you've created., 1
"Even video from a rip-o-matic [an in-house piece of creative work intended
to convey the "look and feel" of a finished ad] or footage shot for a trade
show convention can wind up on the internet," 2the
executive continued,
"providing another source for potential litigants." 66
Many of those interviewed noted that popular music, advertising, and
publicity rights can form a volatile mixture. Most advertising on broadcast
media has a music component and advertisers often utilize vocalists.
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Sometimes the song is central to the message and success of the
advertisement, other times it is merely background accompaniment. In
either case, advertisers must be careful not to use an original piece of music
without obtaining consent of the vocalist. One executive explained, "when
we create an idea we might pick up an existing piece [of music] that has a
vocalist, but when it gets down to the nitty gritty, we know we can't mimic
her. That's when we go to the musicologists."26 7 A familiar example of the
work of musicologists can be found in the H&R Block advertisement
currently airing on network television. The spot features the song "Tax
Man," but not the version originally produced by the Beatles. "This is what
musicologists do," one executive said. "They are part lawyer and part
musician. They change a musical score or voice so that it comes close to
[but does not infringe upon] the original work."2" For some agencies, it is
just not the same. "Compared to real [original] music, it feels like [what
you would hear in] an elevator," an interviewee said, "it lacks the emotional
context of the original song. With larger accounts, like Mitsubishi or

Cadillac, the client usually says: "let's just buy the music. ' ''269 If a celebrity
is unwilling to consent to the use of his or her voice, just looking into
licensing such use may "leave you more vulnerable" in the view of one
interviewee, because 271
the celebrity is more likely to direct an agent to watch
or listen for the spot. '
The final area probed in the interviews was the impact of White, if any,
on the manner in which advertising agencies conduct business. None of the
advertising agency executives interviewed suggested that the White decision,
by itself, had a direct, identifiable effect on their business operations. "It was
really a cumulative effect, not the Vanna White case alone, but the weight of
all of the decisions at the time that changed our business," one interviewee
remarked.2 71 Others attribute greater significance to the Midler case. For
example, one person explained, "in Midler,Y&R only used a person's voice.
Think about how many people sound similar. Previously, everyone
[agencies] was always aware that a physical association [with a celebrity] was
not allowed. But now, a voice, a non-visual representation. No one
expected it. , 272 This seemed to fit with the view offered by an entertainment
law attorney that White "did not have the dire consequences people thought
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it would." 27 3 "Most studios are more conservative than they need to be in
clearing uses," he said.274 Such caution seems widespread in the advertising
said, "we don't want to
business. "We're always concerned," an ad executive
275
position."
compromising
a
in
put our clients
Caution is a common thread connecting specific practices adopted by
advertising agencies post-Midlerand White. Approaches mentioned during
the interviews ranged from "giving our clients a heads-up, alerting them as
to possible ramifications [of pursuing an authorized and possibly protected
277
use]" 276 to "having more people look at the advertising as it is developed"
to "editing yourself [and thus rejecting potentially problematic ideas].
One interviewee summed it up this way: "our attorneys have told us to be
as safe as possible. This wasn't always the case. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, the bottom line was not even looked at. The world of Hollywood is
flaky. We alljust assumed that a production company [involved in recording
voices, images, or music] would have the necessary experience to keep
agencies out oftrouble. But instead, agencies had to learn over time. Today,
all agencies have become more concerned with the company's financial
making clear that there is little room for error and increased
position,"
27 9
liability.

IX. ANALYSIS
The question ofwhether the White decision changed the way advertising
agencies conduct business is not a novel one. Many commentators have
examined the intersection between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity, but a survey of recent law review articles relating to the White case
revealed only one instance where empirical research was used to determine
if the commercial speech of advertisers has been "chilled" by the Ninth
Circuit's decision. 2' The commentator concluded, "advertisers are reacting
to the Vanna White case by steering away from the kind of ads that it
involved, ads that refer to popular culture in such a way as might be found
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to "appropriate," without consent, a celebrity's "identity."" 28 The results of
this study are generally in accord with that statement, but they fail to find
such a direct effect. Instead, the study results indicate that: 1) the
cumulative effect of White and the publicity rights cases that preceded it was
to cause uncertainty about the law among advertising executives; 2) this
uncertainty coincided with significant changes within and external to the
advertising industry that raised the risk averseness of agencies and induced
avoidance behavior with respect to celebrity dealings; and 3) despite this
avoidance, the creative process within advertising agencies remains robust,
but right of publicity considerations, alone or in combination with other
factors, have had some impact on creative concepts ultimately flowing to the
commercial marketplace of ideas.
The research results strongly suggest that White, by itself, had little effect
on advertisers. Many of the senior advertising executives interviewed had
not even heard of the White case, and the advertising industry was already on
alert over the right of publicity by the time the Ninth Circuit handed down
its decision. This is evident from the considerable amount of press coverage
of publicity rights issues documented from the decade preceding White.
Nonetheless, the case came to symbolize how far the right of publicity
doctrine had diverged from the protection of a person's name and image.
White and the handful of publicity rights cases that recently preceded it had
shrouded the doctrine in mystery and uncertainty-only the courts knew for
sure what uses of a celebrity's identity were permissible, and even then, the
rules seemed to be changing with each new decision, at least from the
perspective of the advertising industry. 82
Of particular import in raising advertising industry awareness of right of
publicity issues was Midler. Research interviews showed that the decision in
Midler caught the advertising industry by surprise, and the outcome of the
decision spread quickly throughout the industry because virtually all
agencies engaged in some form of advertising via broadcast media which, by
definition, requires a voice or music component. 2 ' Knowledge that the
right of publicity might be subject to broad judicial interpretation,
particularly within the Ninth Circuit, and subsequent encounters with
publicity rights issues during ad production involving vocalists or musicians
fueled fears of increased liability due to ad content. 84
The fears and uncertainties that pervaded the advertising business in the
late 1980s and early 1990s were amplified and augmented by substantial
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changes that were occurring both internally and externally to the advertising
business. A merger and acquisition trend among agencies developed in the
1980s, and industry consolidation continued well into the following
decade.28285 By the mid-1990s, economic growth in the U.S.
was over three
percent, contributing to increase advertising spending.287 The share of
22

market of the top ten global agencies, however, remained relatively stable.2 8
Industry analysts speculated that agencies were likely finding the profitable
management of networks to be more difficult than the formation of
alliances. 289 This led to a renewed focus on the "bottom line," a shift that
was confirmed by several of the executives interviewed.2 °
Industry consolidation, competition, and stalled market shares
undoubtedly narrowed the margin of error for many advertising agencies.
As agencies became more risk averse, company policies-especially those
having fiscal impact-turned more conservative. The research found this
to be particularly true in mid- to large-size advertising agencies.29' Creative
directors and account executives were being told that clients and revenue
must be preserved, and in light of this edict, pushing the limits of the
creative envelope with respect to the use of celebrity identity surely must
have seemed unwise for all but the small, financially solvent "hot" shops that
operated in local markets.2 Smaller agencies may be on equal footing with
larger ones with respect to the receipt of "cease and desist" letters, but they
are less likely to be the target of lawsuits because they lack the "deep
pockets" that make them attractive to celebrity plaintiffs. 293 For this reason,
smaller shops may be inclined to shoulder more risk. The exception may be
where the client agrees to contractually indemnify a large advertising agency,
but even this practice may not embolden an agency to develop "cutting
edge" creative material that is inherently more risky.'
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Factors external to the advertising business were also having a profound
effect on agency assessment ofthe risks associated with ad production during
the 1990s and beyond. Chief among these was a remarkable revolution in
communications media, driven by technology. Along with such change
came the possibility of increased exposure of virtually any advertising work
product, finished or unexecuted. This possibility added to the fears of
advertising agency executives, who immediately recognized the pitfalls of
instantaneous, electronic communications.29 s
The rise of the personal computer in the early 1990s and the growth of
the internet that followed literally transformed the sharing and
dissemination of information, raising the stakes on risk for advertising
agencies. Gone was the limited distribution safety net that protected
agencies choosing to implement advertising campaigns locally or regionally.
In its place was instantaneous electronic transmission of images, text, and
music. On the sending end were advertisers,296 web gurus and anyone who
could load a file onto a computer. On the receiving end, potentially, were
millions of viewers located in virtually every corner of the world, including
potential litigants. The technology explosion had vaporized the idea that
local campaigns would only be seen by those locally situated.
Advertisements that formerly carried a low risk of infringing upon
someone's publicity rights could now be, with a few keystrokes, on the desks
of agents and in the homes of celebrities.
The research suggests that shifting right of publicity law, industry
consolidation, and technology advancements collectively induced behavior
modification on the part of risk-sensitive advertising agencies, which took
steps to minimize legal conflicts involving celebrities in the decade following
White. Evidence of behavior change can be found in the decline of celebrity
endorsements in print advertising during the 1990s when compared to the
previous decade, as shown by the quantitative data collected. The data
reflect a similar downward trend in the use of parody as a communications
technique in print advertising when the two periods are compared.
Although the trend is clear, ascertaining the specific reasons for the shift and
the relative weight of each contributing factor is somewhat speculative.
In some instances, right of publicity law undoubtedly played a primary
role in the decision not to utilize celebrity talent. There is even evidence of
cross-contamination between different types of advertising media. One
interviewee explained that a negative agency experience with sound-alikes,
.95
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for example, might be transferred to other contemplated uses of celebrity
talent, even in instances where unauthorized uses might be deemed
permissible. 297 Legal action or the threat of litigation resulting from
production ofa radio advertisement may have the broad effect of causing an
agency to back away from using celebrity talent in other types of advertising
media.
In other cases, uncertainty about right of publicity law may have a more
indirect effect on an agency's ultimate decision regarding the use of celebrity
talent. Several interviewees mentioned that dealing with a celebrity's ego
can be difficult, and past experiences of this nature may cause an agency to
refrain from recommending creative strategies that involve celebrities when
pitching clients. 298 On its face, such a decision appears driven by concerns
about the celebrity's temperament, but a fear of litigation undercurrent may
be at work as well. Agencies or advertisers may also make a conscious choice
against associating a product with a celebrity to avoid the possibility of
having the product become tainted should the celebrity fall from public
favor. 299 Again, the link to right of publicity is an indirect one. If the
advertiser pays a premium for the use of a celebrity's identity and that image
is not as it appeared to be, a double loss may be sustained-the investment
and the value of lost product sales. When legal uncertainty and high
investment costs for celebrity talent combine, the risks may outweigh the
A decision may also turn on the most efficient
potential benefits.
application of an advertiser's resources, and relying on the associative value
of a celebrity to do the tough work of building product sales again, in light
of the legal uncertainties, may not make strategic sense for the agency or the
client.
In sum, as the risk averseness of advertising agencies increased in the
decade following White, the unpredictability of publicity rights law must
certainly have been amplified. There is little doubt that court decisions like
those in Midler and White figure significantly in an agency's calculations
when the use of celebrity talent is being contemplated. Right of publicity
concerns may be at work below the surface, too, during the exploratory
stages of creative development, as indicated by the research interviews. 3°°
These direct and indirect effects are manifested in the reduced reliance on
celebrities in print advertising, and a noted reluctance to push the edges of
the creative envelope with breakthrough, high-risk advertising campaigns.
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Despite the documented avoidance behavior occurringin the post-White
years, the research revealed that the creative process within advertising
agencies remains robust. Although research results were mixed on the
matter of whether the creative output of advertising agencies has been
negatively affected-that is, constrained or limited-by the White decision,
virtually all of the executives interviewed maintained that the creative
process itself was intact, vibrant, and effective. Close analysis of their
comments showed that in the concept stage, creativity is rarely confined by
right of publicity concerns. This speaks to the tremendous power of creative
development, which, the interviewees suggested, is difficult to stifle by law.
White and the right of publicity cases that followed clearly had some
effect on the final product of the creative process-in this case, print
advertising. Even where this occurred, however, advertisers did not retreat
from the use of celebrity identity entirely. In some instances, creative
expression was redirected and channeled into 'safer' uses, as found during
the review of parody in print advertising conducted for this study.
Parody has been recognized as a unique form of expression deserving of
constitutional protection in some contexts. Judge Kozinski worried that,
after White, parodists would be "held hostage" by celebrities 30 ' and some
commentators feared that agencies would abandon the use of parody as an
advertising tool.30 2 Although this study made no attempt to examine the
incidence of parody in broadcast advertising, it did incorporate a limited
review of advertising appearing in magazines before and after the White
decision.
Study results show that the use of parody as a print
communications technique was fairly limited even before White, and that it
declined further still in the 1990s. These results conform to the general
trend regarding the appearance of celebrity endorsements in print
advertising.
More recently, however, there has been a point of departure from this
trend. The research revealed that a resurgence in the use of parody in print
advertising occurred over the last few years. Interestingly, current print
advertisements utilizing this technique have almost wholly relied on either
political figures or deceased celebrities. That interviewees suggested such
uses fall into a "gray area" of the law and are thus perceived as being less
risky is one means of accounting for this phenomenon.3 3 At the core of this
resurgence is the notion that if one creative outlet becomes obstructed in
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some way, legally or otherwise, another one opens up. This idea surfaced
repeatedly during the interviews. To a person, none of those interviewed
believed that the final product of creative development by their agency-the
finished advertisement-was second rate, even where there was an earlier
decision to abandon a certain idea as being too risky. This faith in the
quality of the end product of creative development poses some interesting
theoretical questions, with which this analysis concludes.
First, if an advertisement is effective and represents a satisfactory end
product to the client, it seems difficult to assert that the creative process is
shortchanged, as some commentators fear.3 4 Ultimately, judgment on the
creative content of a finished advertisement rests with the advertiser. It is
the advertiser who pays for the message and measures how effectively the
message reaches and generates a response by the target audience. To the
advertiser, the measurement is tangible and real, as reflected in product sales.
Implicit in the measurement is the degree to which a "connection" was
made with individual members of the target audience-one that compelled
a consumer response and triggered purchase behavior. The creativity of the
advertisement plays a prominent role in the success of this connection. If,
in the eyes of the advertiser, the creativity of the advertising message is
valuable, is there an argument that an agency's avoidance of celebrity talent
makes the commercial less entertaining, thus depriving the public of cultural
enrichment? It depends.
The debate over the chilling effect of right of publicity law on creative
expression and free speech is largely one that arises because of the
pervasiveness of advertising in our culture. When an advertisement is
broadcast or appears in print there is an unintended effect-it reaches
collateral consumers not within the target audience. Unlike product sales
or advertising recall surveys of target consumers, impacts on secondary
audiences are usually not measured. Viewers, listeners, and readers are not
shy about offering an opinion about a particular advertisement, however, or
critiquing its entertainment value. This leads to some interesting questions
about the role of advertising in modem society.
Although some commentators prescribe that buyer-seller transactions
contribute little, if anything, to the marketplace of ideas, advertising holds
a special place in the world of communication. It has been called "a medium
of information"3' and "clearly art."3" Its elevated status over other forms of
communication can be attributed, in part, to its presence in our everyday

Yo
305

306

Barnett, supra note 106, at 16; Braatz, supra note 44, at 9.
DAVID OGILVY,OGILVYON ADVERTISING 7 (Vintage Books 1985).
MICHAELSCH UDSON,ADVERTISING, THE UNEASYPERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACTON

AMERICAN SocIETY 222 (Basic Books 1984).

2003]

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

lives. Whether welcomed or despised, advertising reaches us, allowing the
American economic system to function. 3 7 The marketplace of ideas, then,
would seem to thrive on infusions of advertising. But this doesn't comport
with the view that "there are only seven stories out there" expressed by
several of those interviewed.30° If all communications messages were simply
iterations of messages already told then, theoretically at least, it would not
be possible to deprive the public by avoiding celebrity endorsement or
parody. Advertising giant Leo Burnett wrote, "the secret of all effective
originality in advertising is not the creation of new and tricky words and
pictures, but one of putting familiar words and pictures into new
relationships." 3°9 As pure entertainment, advertising may indeed contribute
to the enrichment of culture. To argue that advertising should be protected
against excessive control by celebrities, however, one must first embrace the
view that advertising has value outside of a commercial context, at which
point the distinction between commercial speech and other forms of
expression is effectively discarded. The opposing view holds that the
advertising industry exists for a separate purpose, and should not be saddled
with fulfilling societal desires for unbridled speech. In the end, the value of
advertising and the contribution it makes toward enriching our culture is
highly subjective.
Second, assuming arguendo that advertising does play an appropriate
part in cultural enrichment, is this role more deserving of protection than
the rights of celebrities? Or is the deprivation of cultural enrichment that
presumably results from the overprotection of celebrities substantially
outweighed by the entertainment value they provide? Some theorists would
look to the economic incentive theory that underlies the right of publicity
to answer those questions. Simply put, the theory posits that rewarding
celebrities encourages creativity and promotes cultural enrichment. If the
tension between celebrity rights and the entertainment value of advertising
is viewed as a zero sum game, then the gain in creativity realized through the
legal enhancement of one activity occurs at the expense of creativity lost as
a result of the other activity, which is afforded fewer protections. With this
in mind, a strong argument could be made that deconstructing economic
incentives for celebrities does more to diminish the marketplace of ideas
than "limiting" the creative breadth and scope of advertising. The primary
purpose of advertising, after all, is selling, not entertainment, rendering
cultural enrichment an indirect consequence ofa commercial advertisement.
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By contrast, celebrity performances are directly and irrefutably a component
of our national culture.
Reconciling the two competing views may not be possible. To the
extent that the doing so depends upon the subjective assessment of the
relative contribution of each activity-the value of celebrity performances
and the value of advertising-on the measuring scale of cultural enrichment,
the debate could long endure.
X. CONCLUSION

The common law right of publicity and the protection it affords against
misappropriation of a person's name or likeness is an eminently rational
extension of the privacy doctrine, particularly when those aspects ofpersona
have economic value and are wrongly exploited for commercial gain. It is
rational, too, that the doctrine should evolve over time to engender a
property right with dimension and depth. When Vanna White's right of
publicity case came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in 1992, however, expansion of the doctrine to encompass other indicia of
a person's identity seemed less thanjudicious. Concern arose among legal
scholars and commentators that White would stifle the creativity of
advertising agencies, causing them to avoid the use of celebrities and parody
ultimately depriving them of cultural
in commercial advertisements,
310
richness and vitality.
This study tested several theoretical propositions presupposing that
White had an impact on the advertising business. In a narrow sense, research
results showed that White, by itself, was rarely mentioned as the reason for
the reduction in the use of celebrity talent by advertising agencies that
characterized the 1990s. As a symbol ofthejudiciary's willingness to broadly
construe the meaning of identity, however, White had significant impact.
Advertising agencies could no longer discern with certainty which elements
of a celebrity's persona were legally protected. For instance, White and the
publicity rights cases that preceded it seemed to engender more questions
than answers. At the same time, changes within and external to the
advertising industry were causing advertising agencies to become more risk
averse. Uncertainty about the law and intensified risk sensitivity induced a
response in the advertising community, particularly with respect to their
dealings with celebrities.
The response disclosed by the research has been characterized as
"avoidance behavior," but in reality, this expression may go too far. The
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appearance of celebrity endorsements and parody in print advertising
declined in the 1990s over levels seen in previous decade but-knowing a
good thing when they see it-advertising agencies certainly did not forsake
the time-proven practice of blending brands and celebrities into winning ad
campaigns when it made strategic sense to do so. Instead, they exercised
more caution, in large part because of right of publicity law.
Heightened caution in celebrity dealings during the post-W'ite decade
led advertising agencies to conduct business differently, and effects on the
creative development process were noticeable. Creativity in advertising was
not about to yield to celebrity control; however, the creative force is not so
easily tamed. As the law discouraged advertisers from pursuing certain
creative channels, alternative ones opened up, and the research clearly
indicates that the creative development process remains innovative and
robust even in the wake of White, as evidenced in the recent resurgence in
parody.
Right of publicity law is still undergoing change within California. The
California Supreme Court, in its ruling in Comedy III, recently signaled that
only works that sufficiently transform a celebrity's likeness warrant
protection under the First Amendment. Whether this amounts to a check
on the Ninth Circuit's expansive interpretation of the common law right of
publicity remains to be seen. Even if it does, advertising agencies are not
likely to return to the unfettered creative development process of the 1960s.
For now, the Comedy III decision is the final word on the breadth of
protection afforded by the doctrine within California, and White remains a
major milestone in the line of cases that define the property rights of
celebrities.

